cnlarly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of these his inferior intelligences likewise, as well as of the supreme mover, that they do *Kiwfiv* we rcXoe, move only as the end.

Where it is evident, that though Aristotle did plainly suppose a mundane intellectual soul, such as also contained, either in it, or under it, a plastic nature, yet he did not make either of these to be the supreme Deity; but resolved the first principle of things to be one absolutely perfect mind or intellect, separate from matter, which was <mv»?roc *ovala** an iminoveable nature,—whose essence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved, or as the final cause: of which he pronounces in this manner, *on* c/c roi-

Met. I. 14. *avrric* «(>X[r]^ f/pTijrae o ovpavoc *Kal* 77 ^vcrtc,

to^fv.tpek that upon such a principle as this, heaven and nature depends;—that is, the animated heaven, or mundane soul, together with the plastic nature of the universe, must of necessity depend upon such an absolutely perfect and immoveable mind or intellect.

Having now declared the Aristotelic doctrine concerning the plastic nature of the universe, with which the Platonic also agrees, that it is, 17 jugpoc ^*>xrk' $ *iw* ^>[ev] ^vy^e, either part of a mundane intellectual soul (that is, a lower power and faculty of it), or else not without it, but soine inferior thing depending on it;—we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle supposed, distinct frofti the supreme Deity, yet there might notwithstanding be a plastic nature of the

[a] Arisiot. Melapbysicor. lib. xiv. cap. vi. p. 477.